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That Thing Venture Capitalists Do
Mitchell Berlin*
One key to economic prosperity is the ease
with which promising new goods and technolo-
gies are identified, developed, and brought to
the attention of the consumers and firms that
use them. But there is no single blueprint or
framework for guiding an idea from its begin-
ning as a lightbulb over an inventor’s head to
its ultimate destination—the assembly line,
drugstore, or desktop. One such framework, the
venture capital industry, is a unique contribution
of the U.S. financial system, although one that
is increasingly being copied around the world.
The central role of venture capital in some of
the best known success stories of recent years—
Microsoft, Genentech, and Federal Express, to
name just a few—has put the industry in the
headlines.
Although just about everyone knows the
term venture capital, not many people know
precisely what venture capitalists do: How do
they identify entrepreneurs with promising
new ideas? What kinds of services do they pro-
vide to these entrepreneurs? What role do they
play in helping entrepreneurs secure funds?
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How successful has the venture capital indus-
try actually been? It’s only in the last few years
that financial economists have begun to care-
fully describe and analyze the distinctive fea-
tures of the venture capital market and provide
systematic answers to questions like these.1
An understanding of the venture capital in-
dustry is important to policymakers in the
United States and abroad. Some policymakers
in the United States believe that the government
can adapt the institutions of the venture capi-
tal industry to increase small firms’ access to
external finance. And outside the United States,
policymakers debate ways to nurture the
growth of domestic venture capital industries,
while businessmen are already busily starting
venture capital firms.  Such public policies are
more likely to succeed if  their designers un-
derstand what makes the venture capital indus-
try tick.2
WHO NEEDS A VENTURE CAPITALIST?
Why Al Needs a Venture Capitalist. Con-
sider Al B. Gates—an industrial biologist,
turned entrepreneur—who was recently rein-
carnated as the startup firm Alpha Biotronics.
Alpha holds the patent on a smart bacterium
that was conceived in Al’s basement lab. Until
now, Alpha has covered its costs using a patch-
work of financing sources, most recently an
$80,000 equity investment by a retired local
businessman, who made his own small fortune
in biologics and who was introduced to Al by a
mutual friend in the biological community.  This
businessman—an angel in market lingo—has
not only provided funds but has also given Al
useful advice about developing a coherent busi-
ness plan.3
However, angels seldom invest more than
$100,000, and the firm now needs a lot more
than that. Also, Alpha’s management team
lacks the marketing and financial experience to
complement Al’s technical and industry exper-
tise, but the businessman simply hasn’t the time
or contacts to help Alpha recruit professionals
with the appropriate skills. Alpha’s angel has
played a central role in moving the firm to the
next stage, but further financing must come
from elsewhere.
Alpha investigated the possibility of a long-
term bank loan, but it became immediately clear
that banks simply won’t lend to startup firms
in untested markets, especially firms without
tangible assets to post as collateral.4  And even
under the most optimistic business plan, Alpha
doesn’t forecast revenues high enough to make
interest payments any time soon. What Al needs
is a venture capitalist, but he’s not the only one.
Why Calipers Needs a Venture Capitalist.
Calipers is one of the largest employee pension
funds in the United States. For a number of rea-
sons, Calipers is the type of investor that might
1This article focuses on the recent empirical literature.
Christopher Barry’s article contains a review of much of
the recent academic literature on venture capital, includ-
ing important theoretical contributions that I don’t discuss.
Paul Gompers’ 1994 essay presents a fascinating history of
the venture capital industry.
2See Josh Lerner’s 1996 analysis of the Small Business
Innovation Research program for an example of one gov-
ernment program that has tried to provide venture capital
to small, high-technology firms.  Also, see Paul Gompers’
1994 article and the Staff Study by George Fenn, Nellie Liang
and Stephen Prowse for discussions of the changing for-
tunes of small business investment corporations (SBICs),
which were established by the Small Business Investment
Act of 1958 to provide risk capital to small businesses.
3Although there are no reliable data, analysts estimate
that annual investment in the angel market is roughly $20
billion, about five times as large as the yearly investment
in the venture capital market over the last 15 years. Many
firms that receive venture capital funding have previously
received angel financing. See William Wetzel’s article for a
description of the angel market.
4Banks do provide venture capital financing through
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find venture capital investments particularly
attractive. The returns on its portfolio are used
to pay retirement benefits for the plan’s benefi-
ciaries, so its liabilities—the promised payments
to beneficiaries—are long term. Thus, Calipers
can be a patient investor. Calipers is also very
large and well diversified; the pension fund can
afford to have some investments that don’t pan
out at all in exchange for the possibility of some
real winners.
If Alpha seems like an ideal investment for
Calipers, why doesn’t the pension fund make
the investment directly, instead of through a
venture capitalist (whose services do not come
cheaply)? The main reason is that a large diver-
sified pension fund can’t develop specific ex-
pertise on a wide range of industries, especially
those that exist primarily in entrepreneurs’
imaginations.  Deciding whether Alpha’s smart
bacterium has real commercial applications and
then working closely with novice managers like
Al to bring his bacterium to market would de-
mand a level of focused attention on single in-
vestments that Calipers’ portfolio managers
can’t provide. To get in at the ground floor of
the coming nanotechnology revolution, Cali-
pers needs a venture capitalist.
VENTURE CAPITALISTS AND OTHER  IN-
TERMEDIARIES
How Does a Venture Capital Firm Work?5
The typical venture capitalist is a member of a
small, independent partnership with a profes-
sional staff of between six and 12 people, in-
cluding a few general partners and a small num-
ber of associates who are venture capitalists in
training. Venture capital firms are small: In 1996
the typical partnership managed between $50
and $99 million in assets, and nearly three-quar-
ters of all venture capital firms managed be-
tween $25 million and $250 million in assets.
In comparison, in 1996 the average U.S. com-
mercial bank had a portfolio of more than $481
million and the 100th largest bank had more
than $7 billion in assets.
Consider Splice and Dysem Associates
(S&D), a 10-year-old venture capital firm with
four general partners managing total assets of
$80 million. The firm’s particular investment
focus is biologics—especially the interface be-
tween microorganisms and microprocessors—
and most of S&D’s investments are in early-
stage firms. Splice and Dysem first met as MBA
students at Stanford after Dysem had given up
an unsatisfying academic career in biology and
Splice had gained experience (and lost his shirt)
as owner of a failed software startup firm. Like
most other venture capital firms—including
ones with less specialized portfolios—S&D in-
vests almost exclusively in firms located not too
far from the partners’ homes in the San Fran-
cisco area.
S&D currently has two separate venture
capital funds running. (See The Venture Capital
Fund.)  The first fund is now seven years old,
and its 25 portfolio firms—those firms in which
the venture capital fund invests—are now gen-
erating returns for investors. Some firms have
been sold to larger companies, and one portfo-
lio firm went public with an initial public offer-
ing (IPO) in the hot market of 1993. Nearly two
years ago, S&D started a second fund, follow-
ing a pattern typical of the industry: Venture
capitalists plan to start a new fund approxi-
mately five years into the life of their previous
fund.  No new firms are added to the portfolio
of the earlier fund beyond this point, while the
venture capital firm harvests the returns on its
previous investments. At the end of 10 years,
the first fund will be wound up, and all of its
remaining cash and securities will be divided
up among the fund’s investors (including S&D).
5Much of the information in this section about the typi-
cal activities of the venture capital fund is drawn from the
pioneering work by William Sahlman. Some of the more
recent numbers are drawn from the study by Fenn, Liang,
and Prowse, which contains a description of the broader
private equity market.
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When Splice and Dysem started their firm,
they had a Rolodex full of contacts but no track
record, and it took them nearly two years to
line up financial commitments from investors
for their first fund.  But with investors in their
initial fund now happily receiving returns on
their investment—and especially with the well-
publicized IPO by one of their portfolio firms—
S&D has found it much easier to line up com-
mitments for its second fund. In fact, the sec-
ond fund was fully subscribed within four
months, a possibility only for firms with good
track records.
Roughly two-thirds of the financing for the
funds comes from institutional investors such
as pension funds, insurance companies, and
university endowments (Figure). This pattern
has been typical of the industry since 1979,
when pension funds began investing in ven-
ture capital funds after the Labor Department
The Venture Capital Funda
Organization of the Fund. The typical venture capital fund is organized as a limited partnership,
in which the venture capitalist—the general partner—invests 1 percent of the funds and the other
investors—the limited partners—invest the remainder.b  Investors make an initial investment and also
a commitment to provide funds up to some maximum dollar amount during the life of the fund.
Limited partnerships have a fixed maturity, usually 10 years for venture capital funds, with an option
to extend the life of the fund up to three years. At the end of the fund’s life, all cash and securities on
hand are distributed to the fund’s investors.
Management of the Fund.  As general partner, the venture capitalist plays an active role in man-
aging the portfolio, but the fund’s limited partners are not permitted to play an active management
role. However, the fund’s investors do have limited voting rights concerning some decisions, for
example, whether the fund’s life should be extended at maturity. Investors also exercise some control
through covenants, contractually agreed rules that place restrictions on the investment decisions of
the venture capitalist.c  For example, one common covenant limits personal investments by fund
managers in portfolio firms.
Compensation Scheme.  The venture capitalist’s compensation has both a fixed and a variable
component.d  The fixed component is a management fee, usually 2 to 3 percent of the funds already
invested. The variable component is approximately 20 percent of the fund’s profits—often called the
carried interest—which is commonly paid to the venture capitalist only after investors have recovered
their investment. (However, this strict priority scheme is not universal.) The remaining 80 percent of
the fund’s profits go to the investors.
aSahlman’s article contains an illuminating discussion of the structure of the venture capital fund.
bIn the 1980s the limited partnership replaced the closed-end mutual fund as the primary organizational form
for the venture capital fund.  In this article, I do not examine the interesting question: Why has the limited partner-
ship become the dominant organizational form for venture capital investments? Tax considerations are probably
not the main explanation, unlike limited partnerships in oil and gas exploration and in real estate. See Fenn, Liang,
and Prowse’s study for a discussion of the growth of the limited partnership in the venture capital industry.
cSee Gompers and Lerner’s 1996 article for a detailed analysis of the functions of different covenants and how
the types of covenants have changed over time.
d Gompers and Lerner’s 1995 working paper contains a careful empirical investigation of compensation schemes.The Downtown Parking Syndrome: Does Curing the Illness Kill the Patient? Richard Voith
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liberalized its interpretation of the “prudent
man” rule under ERISA (the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act).6  Indeed, this rul-
ing not only changed the composition of inves-
tors in the venture capital industry but also in-
creased the total flow of funds into the indus-
try.7
Venture Capitalists Are Like Other Inter-
mediaries in Some Ways . . . In addition to lin-
ing up funds, each partner at S&D spends a
large block of time screening potential invest-
ments, much like a bank loan officer evaluat-
ing a loan application. However, the rejection
rate is very high. A single partner will receive
100 proposals per year, but most will be dis-
missed after a cursory look. Perhaps 10 of the
initial 100 proposals will reach the stage where
two of the firm’s partners examine the deal in
detail,  and of these 10, the assembled partners
will agree to fund only one or two.
One way that venture capitalists think about
potential investments is to ask what rate of re-
turn the investment will yield. Like many other
venture capitalists specializing in early stage
firms, S&D’s partners insist that any firm they
fund have an annual rate of return of at least 60
percent, assuming that the investment suc-
ceeds.8 To get a feeling for how high this cutoff
return is, note that the average annual return
on the S&P 500 since 1945 has been 8.33 per-
cent. A lower return simply wouldn’t justify the
time spent by a venture capitalist in oversee-
ing the firm, especially given the substantial
likelihood of losses. 9
Also, like commercial bankers or investment
bankers, venture capitalists act as consultants for
their portfolio firms. But the consulting side of
the venture capitalist’s relationship with its
portfolio firms is more important than it is for
other types of intermediaries, since the startup
firm’s management is often inexperienced.
Over the years, S&D’s partners have built up
many contacts in the local business community,
and they can recommend a trustworthy accoun-
tant or put the entrepreneur in touch with a
reliable supplier of lab equipment.
...But Venture Capitalists Play a More Ac-
tive Governance Role Than Other Intermedi-
aries.  In the United States, commercial bank-
FIGURE
The Sources of Venture Capital
1978 1995 1996
Banks/Insurance 16 %   5 % 18 %
Foundations/Endowments  9 20 22
Pension Funds 15 40 38
Corporations 10 18   2
Families/Individuals 32 8 17
Other 18 6 3
Source: Venture Capital Journal, Venture Economics.
6Under this rule, pension funds are
limited to investments that would be
undertaken by a prudent investor on
his own behalf.
7Before 1978, new commitments to
venture capital funds had never ex-
ceeded $0.5 billion (in 1993 dollars).  In
1979, new commitments exceeded $1
billion for the first time and averaged
over $4 billion in new commitments
per year throughout the 1980s. (See
Gompers 1994.)
8The investment horizon for deter-
mining the rate of return is the time
until the firm is taken public or sold.
The cutoff return will be lower for later-stage venture capi-
tal investments, since they are less risky.
9Sahlman’s article provides historical evidence that more
than a third of venture capital investments incur a loss and
nearly 12 percent involve a total loss of funds.
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ers and investment bankers seldom play an
active role in making strategic decisions for
firms, nor do they play a significant role in
choosing or dismissing management. However,
active governance is a specialty of the venture
capitalist.  Now that S&D’s partners have
agreed to invest in Alpha—after weeks of in-
tense negotiations over contract terms—Al
knows that Dysem, the partner assigned to
watch closely over Alpha’s affairs, will not be a
passive investor.
At the partners’ meeting where Dysem first
presented the Alpha deal, the expected rate of
return and other financial projections were not
the main objects of discussion. As one real-
world venture capitalist says: “If you can’t do
the math in your head, it’s probably not a ven-
ture deal.”10 For S&D to finance a firm, one of
the partners must have the time and commit-
ment to sit on the firm’s board of directors, al-
though the partner won’t necessarily play such
an active role unless the firm experiences sig-
nificant problems, especially those requiring a
change in the firm’s management.11 In any case,
Dysem expects to visit Alpha about 20 times
during the year and to spend 110 hours in di-
rect contact with Alpha’s managers, either over
the phone or face-to-face.   And since she al-
ready oversees eight other portfolio firms and
sits on the board of directors of five, this is not
a trivial commitment. Like the other partners
in the firm, she will take on oversight of two
new firms each year, but no more.
These extensive oversight activities (and the
high probability of losses) are the reasons that
only firms with extraordinary prospects can be
considered. The need for close contact with the
portfolio firm and time spent traveling to board
meetings also explain why S&D acts as lead
investor only for firms within a reasonable com-
mute of the San Francisco area.12
THE VENTURE CAPITALIST
HAS MANY LEVERS OF CONTROL
The Staging of Finance.  The venture capi-
talist doesn’t make her investment all at once.
Instead, funds are always provided in stages,
and the entrepreneur receives only enough
funding to reach the next stage.13
In part, the staging of finance reflects the
venture capitalist’s view of a firm’s develop-
ment as a series of milestones, in which risks
are reduced one by one.14  For example, seed fi-
nancing allows the entrepreneur to produce a
prototype of a new good. During this stage, the
entrepreneur proves that the design is feasible,
but has yet to establish whether it is market-
able, much less profitable. Each stage has well-
defined performance objectives, and more
funds are provided if performance objectives
are met.
If  performance objectives are not met, the
venture capitalist must make a decision.  Should
the portfolio firm’s strategy be reconsidered?
Should the firm’s management team be
changed? And in the worst case, should fund-
ing be cut off completely? Even if the venture
capitalist decides to provide more funds, the
entrepreneur will pay a price. The venture capi-
10This quote is in Michael Peltz’ article on the venture
capital firm Kleiner Perkins Caulfield & Byers.
11See Lerner’s 1995 article for an analysis of venture
capitalists’ oversight activities on boards of directors.
12When a promising investment outside the venture
capitalist’s geographical area turns up, it may be passed
on to another venture capital firm, which becomes the lead
investor—the firm with primary oversight responsibilities.
The firm that first identified the investment may then be-
come part of a syndicate, in which different firms share the
role of venture capitalist. See Lerner’s 1994(a) article for a
discussion of syndication practices.
13Gompers’ 1995 article has an extensive analysis of the
staging of finance.
14The definition of particular stages is not uniform.
Sahlman presents one description of the stages of venture
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talist inevitably demands a larger share of the
firm’s stock in return for additional funding to
meet some objective.15  This fall in the
entrepreneur’s ownership share of the firm di-
minishes his influence and reduces his future
expected returns.
The severity of the penalties for not meeting
objectives, which range from a reduced owner-
ship share to being replaced altogether, pro-
vides the entrepreneur with powerful incen-
tives to work exceptionally hard and also gives
the venture capitalist lots of power to influence
the firm’s direction.
The Venture Capitalist Holds Convertible
Securities. The securities that the venture capi-
talist receives in exchange for investing funds
in the portfolio firm are more complicated than
simple debt or equity contracts. While the se-
curities are relatively complicated, the main
idea behind their design is straightforward.
Some of the contractual features increase the
venture capitalist’s influence, while others push
the venture capitalist to use this influence in
ways that increase the firm’s value.
The venture capitalist usually receives con-
vertible preferred stock. Like a debt contract, pre-
ferred stock requires the firm to make fixed pay-
ments to the stock’s holder.16 And the promised
payments must be made before any common
stockholder gets dividend payments, that is, the
preferred stockholder has priority over com-
mon stockholders. Hence, the venture capital-
ist can make sure that the entrepreneur is not
paying himself a high salary disguised as divi-
dends. It also means that if things turn out badly
and the firm is liquidated, the venture capital-
ist gets back her investment in the firm before
the entrepreneur gets paid anything.
Unlike preferred stockholders in many other
settings, the venture capitalist usually has vot-
ing rights. In addition, the venture capitalist
usually has a right of redemption, which means
that she can cash out her shares at some prede-
termined price whenever she wants. Along
with the fixed payments, both of these features
give the venture capitalist multiple levers of
control—as well as a way to make a quick exit
if prospects look bad.
With so many features that increase the ven-
ture capitalist’s influence, a well-designed con-
tract should also have features leading her to
use this influence in sensible ways. This is
where the convertibility feature comes in.17 The
right to convert her financial claims into shares
of common stock focuses the venture capitalist’s
attention on the firm’s market value. Since the
firm’s common stock will be valuable only if
the firm does well, the venture capitalist’s vi-
sion is fixed on maximizing the value of the
firm’s stock and ensuring that the firm suc-
ceeds.  In particular, any incentive to cut her
15Both the objectives and the consequences of failing to
achieve them may be written down in the funding con-
tract, in what are termed “milestone” or “benchmark” deals.
This is common in high-tech, early-stage financings. In other
deals, there is an implicit understanding between the firm
and the venture capitalist about the objectives that must be
met to move to a subsequent stage.  When contracts are
implicit, reputational concerns limit the venture capitalist’s
ability to increase her ownership share by threatening to
withhold funds.
16In many ways, preferred stock is more like debt than
equity, and it is priced accordingly in the marketplace. In
addition to contractually fixed payments, preferred stock
has a fixed liquidation value per share, quite similar to a
bond’s face value. However, unlike interest payments on
debt, dividend payments to preferred stockholders are
made at the firm’s discretion, and they can be deferred by
the firm’s board of directors without creating a legal de-
fault. Since venture-financed firms are seldom making cur-
rent profits, the promised dividends usually accrue until
they can be paid at a later date.
17There is substantial variation in the details of funding
arrangements between venture capitalists and portfolio
firms, but the venture capitalist’s right to convert her secu-
rity into voting common stock appears to be more or less
universal. Sahlman’s article contains an extensive analysis
of standard funding arrangements.
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losses and run too quickly is reduced.
A strict focus on the value of the firm’s stock
also goes a long way toward creating a harmony
of interest between the entrepreneur and the
venture capitalist. Both the entrepreneur and
the venture capitalist have a strong interest in
seeing the value of the firm’s stock go as high
as possible, since this increases the wealth of
both.
But perfect harmony is impossible. Although
Alpha Biotronics’ founder may be a brilliant
nanobiologist, there is no guarantee that Al can
manage a commercial firm or fix his gaze on
the commercialization of smart bacteria. Al’s ear-
liest vision was that smart bacteria would build
structures on distant planets (and win him a
Nobel prize).  But this conflicts with Dysem’s
more commercial view that smart bacteria will
build condos at even lower cost than prefab.
And Al’s tenacity in the face of repeated fail-
ure—a necessary trait for a successful inven-
tor—turns out to be plain stubbornness when
Dysem insists that Al give up control to a pro-
fessional manager. In a less noble vein, Al also
likes the perks of being the boss of his own firm.
So why is Al willing to give up so much con-
trol to S&D? While we may sympathize with
Al’s dream of becoming the next Bill Gates, the
venture capitalist’s substantial power to over-
rule the entrepreneur makes economic sense:
Investors will be reluctant to place their money
in such high-risk investments unless contrac-
tual mechanisms reduce risks as quickly and
completely as possible. Al knowingly left him-
self open to the risk of losing control over his
own firm as a condition of getting funding in
the first place.18
For a new product, we tend to think that the
biggest risks are technological, for example, that
it might not work as planned (“can we split the
atom?”).19  But managerial incompetence or the
inability to identify the most valuable commer-
cial use of the product is more likely to derail a
start-up firm than technological bugs (“will the
dogs eat the dog food, or the fish jump out of
the tank?”).  In a 1989 survey by Gorman and
Sahlman, venture capitalists identified manage-
ment failure as the most important reason their
own past investments came to naught. Venture
capitalists see themselves as overcoming risks,
especially the risks of poor management and
mistaken market strategies.
TAKING FIRMS PUBLIC IS THE
VENTURE CAPITALIST’S MAIN GOAL
Foremost in most venture capitalists’ minds
is an exit strategy. The venture capitalist expects
to have an intense involvement with each port-
folio firm for three to five years, at which time
the successful firm is merged with or acquired
by another firm or goes public in an IPO.20  In
the venture capital market, the portfolio firm
that goes public generates nearly all of the re-
turns.21 It is also the “home run” that establishes
a venture capitalist’s reputation. Venture capi-
talists who have previously taken firms public
find it easier to secure commitments from in-
vestors and organize new funds. And in the
aggregate there is a clear relationship between
newly committed funds and IPO activity: When
the IPO market is hot, new funds flow into the
venture capital industry.22
18It is important to note that not every entrepreneur
wishes to retain a permanent controlling position in the
firm. The option to move on to the next project or retire-
ment may be attractive to many entrepreneurs.
19This and the following quote are from John Doer of
Kleiner Perkins Caulfield & Byers. They are reported in John
Heileman’s entertaining article.
20Sahlman reports an average maturity for venture capi-
tal investments of just under five years.
21In one study cited by Sahlman, Venture Economics
reported that IPOs yielded a return of 60 percent over four
years while acquisitions yielded only 15 percent and liqui-
dations lost 80 percent of their value.
22See Gompers 1994.The Downtown Parking Syndrome: Does Curing the Illness Kill the Patient? Richard Voith
23
The central role of public equity markets in
the venture capital process is one of its most
distinctive features. Multiple pressures push the
venture capitalist to bring the portfolio firm
public as soon as possible, yet these pressures
serve valuable functions.
Investors Need an Objective Measure of the
Venture Capitalist’s Performance. Investors
find it very difficult to evaluate the venture-
backed firm’s performance, and, in turn, they
find it hard to evaluate how well the venture
capitalist is doing with their funds. The ven-
ture-backed firm usually has few tangible as-
sets and is invariably suffering operating losses,
so standard balance-sheet measures of perfor-
mance—such as the rate of return on assets—
are not very useful. The firm may be the only
one of its type around, or it may be one of many
firms vying to be the first to come to market
with a product that has yet to be produced prof-
itably.  So, searching for similar firms as a basis
for comparison is useless. For accounting pur-
poses,  the firms in the venture fund’s portfolio
are simply carried at their book value—which
means they are valued at the amount of funds
invested—until the firm moves on to the next
stage, is sold to another firm, or goes public.
Even if investors had some way to determine
the true value of the firms in the fund’s portfo-
lio when they commit their money—and the
commitment is usually for 10 years—the ven-
ture capitalist will continue to add firms for five
years.23  So the portfolio keeps changing. While
venture capital funds typically have covenants
that restrict the venture capitalist’s investment
choices, no tablet of rules can foresee or solve
all problems.
It is not hard to imagine the worries of an
investor whose funds are tied up for 10 years
and who has no way to judge or control the
fund manager’s performance. Since manage-
ment fees are calculated as a percentage of the
fund’s assets, how can the investor be sure that
the venture capitalist is not maximizing fund
size, rather than fund value? And since the ven-
ture capitalist usually must pay investors back
before receiving any profits—and has made
only a tiny share of the initial investment—how
can the investor be sure that the venture capi-
talist is not taking big risks on firms with poor
prospects, hoping for positive returns through
dumb luck?
What the fund’s investors need is an objec-
tive way to evaluate the performance of the
fund. This is what market participants do when
a portfolio firm is taken public. At this time,
market participants judge the venture
capitalist’s performance by how much they are
willing to pay for the portfolio firm’s stock. And
since the venture capitalist’s compensation is
tied to asset values—both through the manage-
ment fee and through the profit-sharing
scheme—investors have an objective measure
for dividing up portfolio returns.
Bringing Firms to Market Allows the Ven-
ture Capitalist to Shift Effort to New Firms.
The successful venture capitalist’s unique mix
of skills includes securing financing, evaluat-
ing ideas and managers, and building success-
ful management teams. Once risks have been
reduced sufficiently, especially with a function-
ing management team in place, it would be
wasteful for the venture capitalist to commit
so much time and so many resources to the firm.
Once a firm has gone public or been sold, it
no longer depends on the venture capitalist for
funds, and the venture capitalist’s responsibili-
ties for governance are substantially reduced.
And since starting a new fund roughly five
years into the life of the preceding fund is the
general rule-of-thumb, the venture capitalist
can now shift attention back to the task of build-
ing firms.
23Funding commitments by investors are not irrevo-
cable, but the penalties for refusing to honor the commit-
ments are substantial. Furthermore, money already in-
vested can’t be withdrawn, and the legal rules governing
limited partnerships severely limit investors’ ability to sell
their shares in the fund.
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DOES THE FOCUS ON TAKING FIRMS
PUBLIC PROMOTE A SHORT TIME
HORIZON?
Some academic specialists and venture capi-
talists believe that the powerful pressure to
quickly bring firms to market promotes exces-
sively short time horizons. Moreover, they ar-
gue that these pressures have increased as in-
stitutions such as pension funds have gained
importance as investors in venture capital
funds. Even though institutions would appear
to be naturally patient investors,  market pres-
sures can force institutional money managers
to focus on immediate payoffs.24 These pres-
sures on institutional money managers are then
transmitted to the venture capitalist.
In fact, there is evidence that less experienced
venture capitalists take firms public too early
in order to establish a reputation, a practice that
has been called grandstanding.  Grandstanding
is costly for both the entrepreneur and the ven-
ture capitalist, since the earlier the firm goes
public, the lower the price that investors are
willing to pay for the firm’s securities.
But a lower price for a portfolio firm’s secu-
rities may not be the only problem.  Subjecting
a fledgling firm to the scrutiny of the public
market before it is ready may reduce the firm’s
long-term likelihood of success. Even more sig-
nificant, pressure to bring portfolio firms to
market too early may bias the venture
capitalist’s investment decisions away from
early stage firms toward later-stage firms. Thus,
highly promising start-up firms might never get
funded. 25
Some Mechanisms Promote a Long-Term
View.  Even if certain pressures drive venture
capitalists to push firms to market too quickly,
the venture capital market also has
countervailing mechanisms.
When a portfolio firm goes public, the ven-
ture capitalist doesn’t just unload her invest-
ment and cash out, but instead retains a sub-
stantial stake in the firm. For example, in one
study of venture-backed IPOs between 1978
and 1987, venture capitalists held 34.3 percent
of the firm’s equity before the offering and re-
tained 24.6 percent of the firm’s equity follow-
ing the offering.  (In nearly 60 percent of the
cases in this sample, the venture capitalists
didn’t sell any of their stock.) And after a year,
the average holdings fell to only 17.8 percent.26
Retaining a substantial financial commitment
to the firm after the IPO focuses attention on
the firm’s longer term prospects.
The design of the venture capital fund also
promotes a long-term view. The venture
capitalist’s investors have made a 10-year com-
mitment to provide money, with an option to
extend this commitment up to three more years.
This setup reduces pressure on the venture capi-
talist to rush a firm to market if, for example, a
number of firms in the fund portfolio are de-
veloping more slowly than expected.27  It also
24This point is made forcefully in the article by Josef
Lakonishok, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. Relative
performance evaluation, in which a fund manager is re-
warded and penalized according to how well he does com-
pared with other fund managers, can promote a short-term
horizon. This can be viewed as an agency cost of delegat-
ing investment decisions.
25See Gompers’ 1996 article for evidence of grandstand-
ing and his 1994 article for a discussion of the influence of
institutional investors. There is some evidence of a shift
toward later-stage investments following the entry of many
institutional investors into the venture capital market in
the early 1980s. But viewed over a longer period, there is
evidence of a renewed shift toward early-stage investments.
This reversal casts some doubt on claims that institutional
investors are the cause of a bias toward short-term results
in the venture capital industry.
26This evidence is from the article by Christopher Barry,
Chris Muscarella, John Peavy, and Michael Vetsuypens.
They also find that investors seem to view the venture
capitalist’s involvement as a certification of a firm’s qual-
ity. For more empirical evidence on the role of venture capi-
talists in IPOs, see the article by William Megginson and
Kathleen Weiss and Josh Lerner’s 1994(b) article.The Downtown Parking Syndrome: Does Curing the Illness Kill the Patient? Richard Voith
25
lessens the pressure to force a merger with a
larger firm if the IPO market is cold. The setup
of the venture capital fund is well adapted to
reducing pressures on venture capitalists to
choose myopic exit options.
CONCLUSION
 Despite vibrant growth during the stock
market and IPO boom of the mid-1990s, the
venture capital industry is quite small if mea-
sured by the amount of funds mobilized. Even
the $6.2 billion of new funds committed in
1996—a healthy jump from the $3 billion per
year of the 1980s—is tiny when compared with
$184 billion spent on research and development
in the United States in 1996. But a list of  the
venture-backed firms that have grown to
prominence in the 1990s suggests that the ven-
ture capital industry has had an effect out of
proportion to the dollars invested.
27Some venture capital firms specialize in purchasing
portfolio remnants, composed of portfolio firms that have
yet to pay off after many years, but which are still too prom-
ising to liquidate. These portfolio remnants are called
tailends and their component firms the living dead. Ven-
ture capitalists who specialize in resuscitating (or burying)
the living dead are analogous to vulture funds in public
debt markets or banks’ workout specialists. See the article
by Renee Deger.
As a form of intermediation, two distinctive
features may help explain some of the successes
of the venture capital industry. Unlike most in-
termediated finance in the United States, ven-
ture capital combines the provision of finance
with active governance and control of the firm
by the venture capitalist. Thus, entrepreneurs
can finance the development of  new ideas be-
yond the sometimes stifling confines of the large
corporation but without losing access to pro-
fessional management skills and strategic guid-
ance. These features may increase the speed
with which new ideas and products are brought
to market.
The central role of public equity markets is
the second distinctive feature of the venture
capital industry. Success for a venture capital-
ist is measured by the number of firms taken
public.  This market test of success reduces in-
trinsic conflicts of interest between venture
capitalists and their investors, although some
observers argue that the drive to take firms
public may also promote a short-term bias in
making investment decisions. The central role
of public equity markets in the venture capital
process reflects the unique depth and sophisti-
cation of U.S. equity markets. Any attempt to
reproduce the successes of the U.S. venture
capital industry must rely on a well-function-
ing capital market or find some functional sub-
stitute.
That Thing Venture Capitalists Do       Mitchell Berlin
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